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THE SUPREME COURT’S DECLINING 
PLENARY DOCKET: A MEMBERSHIP-
BASED EXPLANATION 
David R. Stras* 
INTRODUCTION 
The decline in the Supreme Court’s plenary docket over the 
past thirty years has puzzled commentators. A number of hypo-
theses for the decline have been advanced in the scholarly litera-
ture, including the impact of the cert pool,1 Congress’s elimina-
tion of most of the Supreme Court’s mandatory appellate 
jurisdiction,2 greater homogeneity in the personnel of lower fed-
eral courts,3 a reduction in the number of cases in which the 
United States has sought plenary review from the Court,4 and 
changes in personnel on the Supreme Court.5 Investigation of 
the latter hypothesis has been hampered by the limitations of 
available data, particularly for the Terms of the Supreme Court 
in which the most drastic declines in the plenary docket have oc-
curred, such as from 1992 to 1993 when the number of opinions 
of the Court declined from 114 to 87, the greatest single-year 
 
 *  Associate Justice, Minnesota Supreme Court. This Essay was written while I 
was a Professor of Law at the University of Minnesota Law School. Special thanks go to 
Shaun Pettigrew for coding the data and to Caitlin Dwyer for assisting me with the fig-
ures and tables in this Essay. I especially appreciate the excellent comments on an ear-
lier draft provided by James Spriggs and Timothy Johnson. 
 1. See David R. Stras, The Supreme Court’s Gatekeepers: The Role of Law Clerks 
in the Certiorari Process, 85 TEX. L. REV. 947, 985–96 (2007) (reviewing TODD C. 
PEPPERS, COURTIERS OF THE MARBLE PALACE: THE RISE AND INFLUENCE OF THE 
SUPREME COURT LAW CLERK (2006) and ARTEMUS WOOD & DAVID L. WEIDEN, 
SORCERERS’ APPRENTICES: 100 YEARS OF LAW CLERKS AT THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT (2006)). 
 2. See Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Supreme Court’s 
Plenary Docket, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 737, 751–58 (2001); Arthur D. Hellman, The 
Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 403, 408–12 (1996). 
 3. See Cordray & Cordray, supra note 2, at 771–76. 
 4. See id. at 763–71; Hellman, supra note 2, at 417–19. 
 5. See Cordray & Cordray, supra note 2, at 776–90; Hellman, supra note 2, at 412–
13. 
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percentage drop since the October 1953 Term of the Supreme 
Court.6 
This Essay develops support for the hypothesis that changes 
in the Court’s membership have contributed to the decline in the 
Supreme Court’s plenary docket. The unique dataset contains 
the certiorari votes of all Justices for every case between Octo-
ber Term 1986 and October Term 1993 in which one or more 
Justices voted to grant certiorari or join three other Justices in 
doing so.7 The data and figures in this Essay demonstrate that 
personnel changes have had an impact on the decline in the Su-
preme Court’s plenary docket. 
I. THE SHRINKING PLENARY DOCKET 
The recent decline in the Supreme Court’s plenary docket is 
extraordinary. The Court’s plenary docket reached a modern 
high of 167 Opinions of the Court in October Term 1981, but has 
since declined to a modern low of 70 in October Term 2007, a 
58% reduction in the number of cases decided by the Court. The 
transformation of the plenary docket coincides with a period of 
rapid personnel turnover on the Supreme Court. In contrast to 
the unprecedented lack of any turnover on the Supreme Court 
from October Term 1994 to October Term 2005, five new Justic-
es joined the Court between 1986 and 1993. The following five 
personnel changes occurred: (1) Antonin Scalia for Warren 
Burger in 1986;8 (2) Anthony Kennedy for Lewis Powell in 1987; 
(3) David Souter for William Brennan in 1990; (4) Clarence 
Thomas for Thurgood Marshall in 1991; and (5) Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg for Byron White in 1993. Given that the high turnover 
rate coincides perfectly with acceleration in the decline of the 
plenary docket, it is unsurprising that some scholars have specu-
lated that membership changes have caused or at least contri-
 
 6. Throughout this Essay, the number of opinions of the Court is derived from 
Harvard Law Review’s annual Supreme Court Statistics, which has continuously tracked 
data on the Supreme Court since the October 1948 Term. According to the Harvard Law 
Review, an opinion of the Court is a “signed decision of the Court disposing of a case on 
its merits or a per curiam decision disposing of a case on its merits and containing sub-
stantial legal reasoning.” The Statistics, 119 HARV. L. REV. 415, 415 (2005). 
 7. See infra notes 20–21 and accompanying text. The total number of cases in the 
dataset is 2,528 and the individual votes were obtained from the docket sheets contained 
in the papers of Justice Harry Blackmun, which are housed at the Library of Congress in 
Washington, D.C. 
 8. Of course, Antonin Scalia technically filled the seat vacated by William Rehn-
quist, who replaced Warren Burger as Chief Justice in 1986. The only new member of the 
Court appointed in 1986, therefore, was Justice Scalia.  
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buted to the decline.9 Indeed, in October Term 1986, the Court 
issued 152 Opinions of the Court, but by October Term 1993, 
that number had declined to just 87. Figure One graphically dis-
plays the trend. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
II. THE EFFECT OF CHANGING MEMBERSHIP 
The most direct method of determining whether member-
ship changes have contributed to the declining plenary docket is 
to look at the individual votes of Justices on a Term-by-Term 
basis.10 Fortunately, Justice Harry Blackmun kept meticulous 
records, including docket sheets containing the certiorari votes 
for every Justice while he served on the Supreme Court. Accor-
dingly, the Blackmun papers provide crucial voting information 
from the period of greatest decline in the plenary docket from 
1986 to 1993. 
Several limitations for the data must be recognized at the 
outset. First, although the individual votes of Justices are coded 
by docket number in the dataset, the aggregate data presented in 
 
 9. See Cordray & Cordray, supra note 2, at 776–90. 
 10. The Court applies a “Rule of Four,” in which a case is granted plenary review if 
at least four Justices vote to grant certiorari. A “Join-3 Vote” is a vote by a Justice to 
grant certiorari if three of her colleagues vote to do so. 
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this Essay do not indicate the types of cases on which certain Jus-
tices voted to grant certiorari. Peggy and Richard Cordray have 
noted, for example, that Justices Brennan and Marshall voted to 
grant review in a greater number of criminal cases in which the 
petitioner proceeded in forma pauperis.11 In other words, the 
subtle nuances in aggregate voting patterns by each individual 
Justice are not captured in this Essay. Second, the aggregate vot-
ing data by Justice do not capture other factors that influence 
grants of certiorari by the Supreme Court, such as whether the 
United States Solicitor General is the party seeking plenary re-
view or the number of amicus briefs filed at the certiorari stage. 
Third, the aggregate voting data do not correlate perfectly with 
the Term in which a plenary case is heard and decided by the 
Supreme Court. There is often a delay of three or more months 
between a grant of certiorari and the oral argument to permit 
the parties to have adequate time for briefing. Thus, a vote to 
grant a case during the late spring of October Term 1992 would 
not be heard until one of the Court’s first few sittings of October 
Term 1993. Even so, the aggregate data provide the most persu-
asive case to date in support of the hypothesis that changes in 
the Court’s personnel have contributed to the declining plenary 
docket of the Supreme Court. 
Consistent with the observation that Justices fail to agree to 
a unanimous disposition in the majority of plenary cases, Justices 
also differ in how they approach the certiorari process. As Peggy 
and Richard Cordray explain, “[t]he grant rate of a particular 
Justice . . . combines aspects of personality, judicial philosophy, 
practical administration, political theory and historical perspec-
tive.”12 For any given case, the Justices may disagree on whether 
the case is important enough for plenary review, whether it pro-
vides a good vehicle for answering the question posed in the pe-
tition for certiorari, and whether plenary review of the case is 
likely to result in an outcome or holding that is consistent with 
their ideological views. With respect to the latter point, some 
Justices engage in strategic voting, in which they cast a vote for a 
“defensive denial” in a case “to fend off an undesirable result on 
the merits,”13 or an “aggressive grant” if they are confident that 
 
 11. Cordray & Cordray, supra note 2, at 787. 
 12. See id. at 781. 
 13. Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, Setting the Social Agenda: 
Deciding to Review High-Profile Cases at the Supreme Court, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 313, 
322 (2009) (quoting Gregory A. Caldeira et al., Sophisticated Voting and Gate-Keeping in 
the Supreme Court, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 549, 558 (1999) (describing “defensive denials” 
and “aggressive grants”)). 
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the Court “is aligned with their preferences . . . in an attempt to 
move the law.”14 In other words, Justices’ voting behavior at the 
certiorari stage is partially dependent on the ideological compo-
sition of the Court itself. 
Moreover, voting behavior at the certiorari stage may also 
represent a fundamental difference in how Justices view the su-
pervisory role of the Supreme Court. Justice White, for example, 
held an “unswerving view that the Court ought not let circuit 
splits linger, that it should say what the federal law is sooner ra-
ther than later.”15 That robust view of the Court’s supervisory 
role is reflected in Justice White’s frequent dissents from denials 
of certiorari for cases involving a circuit split.16 Finally, Justices 
have noted that the vote on certiorari is “highly personal,”17 “ra-
ther subjective,”18 and “more a matter of ‘feel’ than of precisely 
ascertainable rules.”19 Thus, the certiorari votes of individual Jus-
tices are dependent not only on ideological and philosophical 
considerations, but also the idiosyncratic preferences of the Jus-
tices who cast them. 
It is unsurprising, therefore, that individual Justices vote to 
grant certiorari at considerably different rates. For the eight 
Terms studied, the average number of votes to grant certiorari 
by a Justice per Term is 105.5, the median is 104.5, and the stan-
dard deviation is 41.37. Table One displays the aggregate num-
ber of votes to grant certiorari per Term for each Justice who 
served between October Term 1986 and October Term 1993: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 14. Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Understanding Collegiality on the Court, 
10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 257, 265 (2008). 
 15. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remembering Justice White, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1283, 
1285 (2003). 
 16. See, e.g., Kindler v. United States, 504 U.S. 946, 948–50 (1992) (mem.) (White, 
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); McMonagle v. Ne. Women’s Ctr., Inc., 493 U.S. 
901, 904 (1989) (mem.) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
 17. WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF 
WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, 1939-1975 175–76 (1980). 
 18. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT: HOW IT WAS, HOW IT IS 265 
(1987). 
 19. John M. Harlan, Manning the Dikes, 13 REC. ASS’N B. CITY N.Y. 541, 549 
(1958). 
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No examination of the relationship between the certiorari 
votes of Justices and the size of the plenary docket would be 
complete without also taking into account “join-3 votes,” in 
which a Justice effectively votes to grant certiorari if three or 
more of her colleagues cast “grant” votes in a particular case. 
David O’Brien has argued that “[j]oin-3 votes clearly lowered 
the threshold for granting cases and contributed to the inflation 
of the plenary docket” by relaxing the Rule of Four.20 His con-
clusion was based on the fact that, according to the bench me-
mos contained in the papers of Justice Thurgood Marshall, 192 
cases (or 12% of the total number of plenary cases) were placed 
on the plenary docket between 1979 and 1990 with less than four 
grant votes and one or more join-3 votes. Consistent with the 
treatment of join-3 votes by other scholars and the findings of 
Professor O’Brien, I will treat a join-3 vote as the functional 
equivalent of a vote to grant certiorari because a join-3 vote 
serves as a grant if three other Justices unconditionally vote to 
hear the case.21 Accordingly, Table Two combines grant and 
join-3 votes into one convenient table by Justice and Term. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 20. David M. O’Brien, Join-3 Votes, The Rule of Four, the Cert. Pool, and the Su-
preme Court’s Shrinking Plenary Docket, 13 J.L. & POL. 779, 798 (1997). 
 21. See, e.g., Cordray & Cordray, supra note 2, at 780. 
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Between 1986 and 1993, the average number of votes to 
grant plenary review22 by a Justice per Term is 118.5, the median 
is 114.5, and the standard deviation is 42.83. 
The tables reveal two important trends not available from 
any other dataset. To begin with, the data demonstrate that 
membership changes appear to have influenced the size of the 
plenary docket; three membership changes, all occurring after 
the October 1989 Term, are particularly significant. First, Justice 
Souter, who voted to grant plenary review an average of 83 times 
per Term from 1990 to 1993, replaced Justice Brennan, who 
voted to grant plenary review an average of 129.25 times per 
Term from 1986 to 1989. Second, Justice Thomas, who voted to 
grant plenary review an average of only 71.7 times per Term 
from 1991 to 1993,23 replaced Justice Marshall, who voted to 
grant plenary review an average of 124.6 times per Term from 
1986 to 1991. Finally and most significantly, the substitution of 
Justice Ginsburg for Justice White likely had a transformative 
effect on the size of the plenary docket. Justice White voted to 
grant plenary review a prodigious 215.6 times per Term, on av-
erage, between 1986 and 1992, or 67% more often than Justice 
Brennan, who voted to grant plenary review the second most of-
ten of any member of the Court during the period. Meanwhile, 
 
 22. For purposes of this Essay, a “vote to grant plenary review” includes both grant 
and join-3 votes. 
 23. Justice Thomas’s votes to grant plenary review for the October 1991 Term do 
not reflect data for an entire Term because he did not join the Court until October 23, 
1991, after the Court’s conference disposing of the petitions for certiorari filed during the 
summer. Even so, his aggregate voting data for October Terms 1992 and 1993 demon-
strate that he is far more stingy in his votes to grant certiorari than was his predecessor, 
Justice Thurgood Marshall. 
!!!STRAS-271-THESUPREMECOURTSDECLININGPLENARY.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 12/10/2010 10:47 AM 
158 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 27:151 
 
consistent with her scholarly writings urging the Court to exer-
cise self-control in managing the size of its plenary docket,24 Jus-
tice Ginsburg voted to grant plenary review during the October 
1993 Term only 63 times, or 29.2% as often as her predecessor. 
By 1993, those three membership changes alone had ac-
counted for an average reduction of 251.75 votes per Term in fa-
vor of plenary review. Given that the mean number of votes to 
grant plenary review per Justice during the period is 118.5 votes, 
it is as if by 1993, the membership changes on the Court had re-
duced the number of votes cast in favor of plenary review by two 
full members of the Court, meaning that the Rule of Four was 
essentially operating with the functional equivalent of only seven 
of the members of the pre-1990 Court.25 As Figure Two demon-
strates, each of the new Justices appointed between 1986 and 
1993 was stingier with their votes to grant plenary review than 
their predecessors. Figure Four powerfully illustrates the differ-
ences in voting behavior between Justices appointed prior to 
1986 and those appointed thereafter.26 It shows that, regardless 
of the other factors that influenced the decline in the plenary 
docket in the late 1980s and early 1990s,27 changes in member-
ship on the Court played a role. Justices appointed in 1986 or 
later voted to grant plenary review, on average, 46.2 times less 
often per Term than their more senior colleagues during the en-
tire period from 1986 to 1993. 
 
 
 
 
 24. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Peter W. Huber, The Intercircuit Committee, 100 
HARV. L. REV. 1417, 1418 (1987). 
 25. See Cordray & Cordray, supra note 2, at 790. Peggy and Richard Cordray fur-
ther observed that “[t]he replacement of Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell with 
Justices Scalia and Kennedy had the overall effect of almost erasing the complement of 
votes cast by an average Justice for plenary review in a particular Term.” Id. at 785. Giv-
en the available voting data, it is safe to assume that membership changes have had a 
demonstrable impact on the size of the plenary docket.  
 26. For the 1986 Term, the average number of votes in favor of plenary review in 
Figure Four for Justices appointed during or after 1986 included only the votes of Justice 
Scalia. By 1993, however, Figure Four includes the average number of votes in favor of 
plenary review for Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, all of whom 
were appointed between 1986 and 1993. 
 27. Most of the other hypotheses discussed by scholars as influencing the size of the 
Supreme Court’s plenary docket, such as greater homogeneity in the Court of Appeals, a 
drop in the number of petitions for certiorari submitted by the Solicitor General, and the 
elimination of mandatory appellate jurisdiction, should theoretically have affected both 
newly-appointed and more senior members of the Court equally.  
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The data also yield another interesting observation. For 
every Justice on the Supreme Court except Justice Stevens, the 
Justices voted to grant plenary review in fewer cases during the 
October 1992 and 1993 Terms than in 1991. The starkest exam-
ple is provided by the votes of Chief Justice Rehnquist, who had 
already reduced his votes in favor of plenary review upon assum-
ing the role of Chief Justice in 1986.28 During the October 1991 
Term, Chief Justice Rehnquist voted to grant plenary review in 
107 cases, but by 1992 and 1993, his votes to grant plenary review 
had dropped to 91 and 63 cases, respectively. A similar pheno-
menon occurred with respect to Justice Thomas, who cast the 
fewest votes in favor of plenary review during the October 1993 
Term. Although beyond the scope of this Essay, several possibil-
ities could explain the pervasive drop in votes in favor of plenary 
review during the October 1992 and 1993 Terms. One possibility 
is that other factors—such as moving from six Justices in the cert 
pool in 1989 to eight by 1991—may have decreased the number 
of cases considered for plenary review by reducing the number 
of external checks on the cert pool.29 Another factor that might 
 
 28. See Cordray & Cordray, supra note 2, at 785 n.243 (noting that Chief Justice 
Rehnquist voted to grant plenary review nearly 240 times per Term as Associate Justice, 
but “averaged only about 120 such votes in the 1989–1990 Terms”). 
 29. See Stras, supra note 1, at 953, 974. It is pretty clear that the reduction was not a 
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explain the decrease in 1992 and 1993 is that, after twelve years 
of Republican presidential administrations, the composition of 
the federal appellate courts may have grown more homogene-
ous, decreasing the number of important circuit splits for the Su-
preme Court to resolve. 
It is also possible that swift membership turnover affected 
the voting behavior of even the stable members of the Court 
during the period. As stated above, Justices act strategically and 
rapid turnover on the Court may affect voting behavior, particu-
larly aggressive grants, because existing Justices cannot be sure 
of the ideological preferences of their new colleagues. Similarly, 
it is possible that certain new Justices, like Justice Ginsburg—
who had previously written about the bloated size of the plenary 
docket—could have persuaded some of her colleagues to reduce 
the number of cases given plenary consideration by the Court. 
Whatever the reasons, the contraction of the plenary docket 
(and the general reduction in the number of votes in favor of 
plenary review) during the October 1991, 1992, and 1993 Terms 
deserves further scrutiny. 
CONCLUSION 
This Essay is intended to be the most comprehensive ac-
count to date of the impact of personnel changes on the size of 
the Supreme Court’s plenary docket. The most important find-
ing is that every Justice appointed between 1986 and 1993 voted 
to grant plenary review less often than his or her predecessor. 
Whether other factors contributed to the declining plenary 
docket is still open to debate, but given the data presented in this 
Essay, there is no question that membership changes had some 
influence on the contraction of the Supreme Court’s plenary 
docket. 
 
result of the federal government filing fewer petitions for certiorari and jurisdictional 
statements. The federal government filed 35, 38, and 33 petitions or jurisdictional state-
ments during the October 1991, 1992, and 1993 Terms, respectively. See OFFICE OF THE 
SOLICITOR GENERAL WORKLOAD REPORT, June 27, 1998-June 24, 1999, at 1 (on file 
with author).  
